For Nagas, lessons from peace accords

As the Government of India prepares the ground for a peace accord with the Nagas, the main challenge that is expected, once the deal is signed, is the possible fallouts including further division and conflict as was the case in previous agreements, most notably the 16-Point Agreement of 1963 leading to the creation of Nagaland State and the infamous Shillong Accord of 1975 that caused further rift in the body politic of the Naga movement.

 Jawaharlal Nehru speaks to tribals in Kohima in March, 1953. Photo: The Hindu Archives

The lessons from past accords appear to be weighing heavily on both the Government of India as well as the Nagas.The peace process involving Delhi and the NSCN (IM) has entered a period of vigilance and course correction with the inclusion of six more Naga Political Groups (NPGs) under the nomenclature Working Group getting involved in the dialogue process with Delhi’s Interlocutor RN Ravi.

Armed groups in Columbia battle for the spoils of peace

Naga Republic News

With the Framework Agreement signed with the NSCN (IM) in August 2015 expected to be finalised any time soon, the absence of the SS Khaplang and Adinno Phizo groups in the talks table so far only adds to the overall political uncertainty and concern. And so while it may not be possible to make further delaysin bringing about some kind of a settlement, any exclusion of Khaplang and Adinno’s group will make the way forward on permanent peace and resolution much more difficult and complex.

Meanwhile it is being reported that following the 2016 peace accord in Columbia, armed groups who have been left out are now battling for the spoils of peace. While the signatory to the peace accord, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) are being slowly integrated to mainstream civilian life, rival armed groups are battling for control of vacated territory and lucrative coca crops.This is according to findings of an independent organization called the International Crisis Group.

According to the report accessed by The Naga Republic, the Colombian government is suffering the backlash of successfully ending decades of war with the FARC. And following the signing of the peace agreement in November 2016, while the FARC fighters moved to 26 cantonments and in June 2017 handed over their weapons, it is reported that dissident groups and those left out of the peace deal have established territorial control in some areas and are seeking to do so in others.

“While this has improved security in some conflict-affected regions, it has allowed armed groups in others to fill the void created by the FARC’s withdrawal, seizing the opportunity to reap illicit revenues and assert local political authority. This makes implementing the peace accords even more challenging since their success depends on tangible improvements in security…” states the report.

Similar to the case of the NSCN (Khaplang) withdrawing from the ceasefire, in Colombia too, despite the ongoing peace talks with theFARC, the country’s other guerrilla force the National Liberation Army (ELN) has increased violent attacks in its strongholds, while expanding elsewhere. Not only that but the report of the International Crisis Group suggests that different organised crime groups are active across Colombia, and have established control over illicit economic activities while looking to infiltrate local politics.

What is even more worrying is that political polarisation, similar to the situation we are facing in Nagaland, continues to impinge on the peace process. Those opposed to the peace accordhave been focusing on the ‘perceived failings’ of the accord, states the report. A similar situation is emerging, especially within Nagaland, by those opposed to the dominance of the NSCN (IM) and the Framework Agreement it has signed with Delhi.

It is reported that the ability of Colombia’s armed groups to profit from criminal businesses has helped them “survive a long asymmetrical conflict with state forces”. And as the FARC withdraws from what is described as “its revenue-generating activities”, various armed groups are now vying to take its place. This includes competing for control of drug production, illegal mining, contraband and extortion. And in several areas, this competition has resulted in rising violence.

B.P. Chaliha, then Chief Minister of Assam, is greeted on his arrival in Kohima by Rev. Michael Scott and Nagaland church leader in 1964. Chaliha had arrived for talks with members of the Peace Mission, for ending hostility with the Nagas. Photo: The Hindu Archives

As fallout it is reported that “established armed groups and new insurgent breakaway factions have attacked state forces, intimidated communities and vied to become undisputed local overlords”. The report states that “grassroots security is crucial to assure the success of the peace process with the FARC as it shifts from an UN-monitored weapons handover to deeper structural reforms of politics and society”.

Of deep concern in the Naga context should be the possibility of such thriving illicit businesses,including extortion rackets– contributing towards mushrooming of armed groups and breakaway factions, some of which we have already being witness to—post the signing of the Covenant of Reconciliation under the Forum for Naga Reconciliation (FNR). It was against this backdrop that the Against Corruption and Unabated Taxation (ACAUT) had been campaigning for ‘one tax one government’of all Naga Political Groups.

If the report on the post-accord situation in Colombia is an indication of what to expect once a peace accord is signed with Delhi, the big lesson to draw upon is that trust and confidence must be restored among all Naga political groups.The inclusion of the Working Group of six NPGs, though a welcome step, does not solve the problem.A last attempt be made to bring the Khaplang and Adinno groups on-board.

The formation of an interim national government or a grand rainbow coalition of all Naga Political Groups under the idea and vision of one-tax-one-govt under one-flag is going to be the best option for now. This will improve the overall security situation and create a level playing field for all groups to jointly participate in the upcoming political settlement.

While all want an ‘early solution’, the bigger question for the immediate is whether an ‘inclusive solution’ can be inked before Christmas or the next elections and if Nagas are indeed really prepared for a peace accord.

Are we? And can we draw our lessons from previous accords and agreements signed with Delhi?